The assignment of powers in Federal and Unitary States by Lockwood, Ben
The Assignment of Powers in Federal and
Unitary States¤
Ben Lockwoody
First Version: January 1997
This version: June 2000
Abstract
This paper studies a model where the power to set policy (a choice
of project) may be assigned to central or regional government via either
a federal or unitary referendum (constitutional rule, CR). The bene…t of
central provision is an economy of scale, while the cost is political ine¢-
ciency. The relationship between federal and unitary CRs is characterized
in the asymptotic case as the number of regions becomes large, under the
assumption that the median project bene…t in any region is a random draw
from a …xed distribution, G: Under some symmetry assumptions, the rela-
tionship depends only on the shape of G; not on how willingnesses to pay
are distributed within regions. The relationship to Cremer and Palfrey’s
(1996) “principle of aggregation” is established. Asymptotic results on the
e¢ciency of the two CRs are also proved.
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1. Introduction
The issue of assignment of tax and spending powers between di¤erent levels of
government is receiving increasing attention amongst economists, perhaps be-
cause many countries are moving in the direction1 of greater decentralization
(Bird(1993)). All countries have constitutional rules or procedures, implicit or im-
plicit, for choosing the level of decentralization of a tax or spending power. These
rules di¤er signi…cantly between federal and unitary states. In federal states, the
allocation of powers is usually speci…ed in the constitution and may require2 a
constitutional amendment. In all major federal states, rules for constitutional
amendment require that at least a majority of sub-central governments must ap-
prove the amendment (Wheare(1963)). For example, in the US, any amendment
must be approved by at least three-quarters of all state legislatures. In a unitary
state, such as the UK, reallocation of powers is achieved either by legislation in the
national parliament, or by national referendum3- the agreement of any sub-central
level of government per se is not required.
While there is now a large and growing theoretical literature on decentral-
ization, remarkably, there is only one4 paper that addresses directly the di¤er-
ent decision-making procedures of federal and unitary states, Cremer and Pal-
frey(1996). In their model, regional or central governments choose some value of
a policy variable (a real number) via majority voting. With centralized choice, it
is assumed that the value of the policy variable must be the same for all regions.
Thus, the cost of centralization is policy uniformity. Moreover, they assume that
voters are incompletely informed about the preferences of other voters, both in
their regions and in other regions. It turns out in this set-up that the bene…t of
1For example, Bird cites the “new federalism” in the US, and moves to federalism in Spain
and Belgium. In the UK, recent referenda on devolution of powers to Scotland and Wales will
result in the establishment of Scottish and Welsh parliaments.
2However, the degree to which reallocation of powers leads to constitutional amendment
varies considerably across federal countries. In the US, there has only been one constitutional
amendment for this purpose (in 1913, to allow a Federal income tax), whereas in Switzerland
there have been a large number of amendments over the last 100 years, enhancing the tax powers
of central government (Wheare(1963), Chapter 6).
3Again, if the reallocation of powers requires a constitutional amendment, a national refer-
endum is sometimes required, e.g. in France (Curtis(1997)). In countries without a well-de…ned
constitution, such as the UK, reallocation of powers requires only a majority in parliament.
4Cremer and Palfrey(1999) use the same model to study the implications of unit- and
population-proportional representation.
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centralization is policy moderation5.
In this setting, Cremer and Palfrey study two referenda, which we call the
unitary and federal two constitutional rules6 respectively. Under the unitary
constitutional rule (CR), a choice between centralization and decentralization is
made by national referendum. Under the federal CR, every region chooses be-
tween centralization and decentralization using a regional referendum, and then
the arrangement preferred by a majority of regions is chosen. These CRs capture
in a simpli…ed way the distinguishing features of federal and unitary states men-
tioned above. They obtain a remarkable result7 : as the number of (equal-sized)
regions become large, whenever the unitary CR selects centralization, the federal
CR also selects centralization (but not necessarily vice versa), so federal CRs un-
ambiguously lead to more centralization. They call this result the principle of
aggregation.
This paper takes an alternative approach to the same question, and in doing
so, addresses three limitations of Cremer and Palfrey’s paper. The …rst limitation
is that (as remarked above) policy uniformity with centralized decision-making
is assumed, rather than derived endogenously as an equilibrium of the political
process. Second, as they say themselves, they do not model any e¢ciency gains
from centralization; in their setting policies are costless (or equivalently, equally
costly). This means that decentralization is always the e¢cient choice, as it allows
for policy diversity8 . Third, due to the information structure, their model is only
tractable if very speci…c assumptions on the distribution of preferences within
regions and between regions are made9, and indeed, Cremer and Palfrey assume
5That is, when the number of regions becomes large, the subjective probability for any
particular voter that the policy variable will, in voting equilibrium, take on an extreme value
(i.e. far from that voter’s most preferred value) is lower with centralization.
6Here, following Buchanan(1975,1987,1988) we refer to all proceedures such as referenda,
parliamentary votes, etc as constitutional rules.
7This follows from Figure 1 in their paper, where it is clear that if the proportion of voters
preferring centralization is greater than 0.5, then the proportion of regions preferring central-
ization must also be greater than 0.5.
8More precisely, as is shown in the Appendix of this paper, in their model, the sum of utilities
across all voters is always strictly greater with decentralization than with centralization.
9Speci…cally, voters do not observe the median voter’s ideal point md in their region directly,
but know the distribution G from which md is drawn, and their own ideal point, t; which is a
draw from a distribution F with median md. From this information, they have to calculate the
mean and variance of md conditional on t: These calculations are only really tractable if G is a
natural conjugate prior for F:
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for the most part10 that both these distributions are Normal. Then question then
arises as to whether their principle of aggregation is an artefact of the Normal
distribution, or whether it holds more generally.
The …rst contribution of this paper is to present a political economy model11 of
the costs and bene…ts of centralization that addresses all these issues. We consider
a model where voters have preferences over a private good and a discrete public
good in their region (a “project”); these preferences are characterized by the
bene…t the voter gets from the project. In this model, there are no constraints on
the distribution of project bene…ts within regions, and between regions. There are
economies of scale in joint production of projects. Following the …scal federalism
literature, we assume that regional governments cannot cooperate to exploit these
economies of scale. So, the bene…t of central provision is that a given number of
projects can be undertaken more cheaply.
More importantly, the cost of centralization is modelled explicitly as political
ine¢ciency, that is, ine¢ciency arising from the legislative process. With central-
ization, the process of decision-making about projects is modelled as a legislative
game, following Baron and Ferejohn(1989), Baron (1991). Moreover, legislative
bargaining is embedded in a citizen-candidate model where any citizen in a region
can stand for election as regional delegate. The equilibrium of this model has
the property that the set of projects that are funded is insensitive to the median
project bene…t in the region, but is driven by cost considerations. In our simple
model, every region’s project is funded with the same probability i.e. there is
endogenously derived policy uniformity.
This model of the costs and bene…ts of decentralization then allows us to study
constitutional rules for allocating powers. In Section 3, we show that with a …xed
and …nite number of regions, and no restrictions on the distribution of project
bene…ts, either within or across regions, there is no particular reason to think that
the federal CR will be systematically more centralized (or indeed decentralized)
than the unitary rule.
In Section 4, we establish the main (asymptotic) results of the paper, under
the assumptions, also made by Cremer and Palfrey, namely; (i) regional medians
10 In Section 4.3 of their paper, they present a uniform distribution example where 100% of
regions prefer centralization, in which case the principle of aggregation certainly holds, but this
example is not general.
11See also Lockwood(1998), Besley and Coate(1998) for political economy models of decen-
tralization, and Caillaud, Julien, and Picard(1996), Cremer and Palfrey(1996), Gilbert and
Picard(1996), Klibano¤ and Poitevin(1996)) for models based on asymmetric information con-
siderations.
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project bene…ts are random draws from a …xed distribution; (ii) conditional on
the regional median, the distribution of tastes within any region is the same; (iii)
the number of regions is large.
We …rst have a key benchmark result. Say that the federal and unitary CRs
are asymptotically equivalent if, in the limit as the number of regions becomes
large, the federal CR will choose decentralization if and only if the unitary CR
does. Then, under some symmetry assumptions on preferences, we show that
the federal and unitary CRs are asymptotically equivalent if the distribution of
median project bene…ts across regions is uniform. This result holds irrespective
of how preferences are distributed within regions.
So, the uniform is obviously the borderline case. We then have two more
results. First, if the distribution of median project bene…ts across regions is pos-
itively single-peaked (i.e. has a quasi-concave density) then the federal CR is
asymptotically more centralized than the unitary CR - i.e. in the limit as the
number of regions becomes large it chooses centralization whenever the unitary
CR does. Second, if the distribution of median project bene…ts across regions
medians is negatively single-peaked (i.e. has a quasi-convex density) then the
federal CR is asymptotically less centralized than the unitary CR. The intuition
for these results is that the federal CR is more sensitive to changes in the distri-
bution of regional medians away from the uniform than is the unitary CR. For
example, a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of regional medians may
convert a uniform distribution into a negatively single-peaked one. In this case,
the proportion of median voters preferring decentralization rises by more than the
proportion of voters in total preferring decentralization.
These …ndings relate to Cremer and Palfrey’s “principle of aggregation” as fol-
lows. The two cases analyzed in their model were when preferences were Normal.
But the Normal distribution is single peaked, in which case our result is that the
federal CR is more centralized, consistently with their principle of aggregation.
As argued above, our set-up also allows us to analyze the e¢ciency of CRs.
Buchanan argues that while policy acts (acts ‡owing from CRs) may well be
ine¢cient in particular cases, we should expect society as a whole to choose con-
stitutional rules that are in some sense e¢cient. Constitutional decisions are
long-run ones, and so the performance of any constitution should be evaluated
from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, where citizens are not sure about what
their position in “society” will be. In Section 5, we study the e¢ciency of federal
and unitary CRs in this sense.
In general, both CRs will be ine¢cient, for the usual reason that majority vot-
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ing does not take account of intensity of preferences. However, in the asymptotic
case, under the same assumptions as before, a number of results can be proved.
Again, the benchmark case is where the distribution of median project bene…ts
across regions is uniform. In this case, both federal and unitary CRs are fully
e¢cient. Also, deviations of both rules from full e¢ciency can again be charac-
terized when the distribution of median project bene…ts across regions is either
positively or negatively single-peaked.
2. The Costs and Bene…ts of Decentralization
2.1. Preliminaries
We develop the simplest possible model for our purpose. There are an odd number
i = 1; ::n of regions, with equal populations of measure 1. The assumption of
equal populations is made as is it is easy (and not very interesting) to generate
di¤erences between federal and unitary CRs when regional populations di¤er12 .
In each region there is a discrete project xi 2 f0; 1g = X. The payo¤ of a resident
of region i is
ui = bixi + yi (2.1)
where bi is a bene…t parameter, and yi is consumption of a numeraire private
good. In region i; bi is a continuously distributed random variable with median
bmi, support
£
bi; bi
¤
, and distribution function Fi.
The project in region imay be provided by regional government i (decentralization),
or by central government (centralization): In either case, the relevant government
is assumed to …nance the public good by levying a proportional income tax. Every
citizen in region i has an endowment of 1 unit of the private good, and pays a
proportional income tax ti, so yi = 1¡ ti.
2.2. Decentralization
In this case, the cost to any regional government of funding its project is c. So,
the regional budget constraint is ti = c where ti is the regional income tax rate.
Substituting personal and regional budget constraints into the utility function
12For example, suppose that there are three regions, and no intra-regional variation in tastes,
and that regions i = 1; 2 prefer decentralization. If region 3 has more than 50% of the total
population, the federal CR will select D, and the unitary CR will select C.
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(2.1), we get
ui = xi(bi ¡ c) + 1
Then, in region i, xi is determined by majority voting over the space of alterna-
tives, X. This implies that
xdi =
½
1 if bmi ¸ c
0 otherwise
So, the utility from decentralized provision for a citizen of i with bene…t parameter
bi is
ud(bi) =
½
bi ¡ c+1 if bmi ¸ c
1 otherwise (2.2)
2.3. Centralization
We assume that there are economies of scale with centralized provision i.e. central
government can produce a vector of projects more cheaply than can regional gov-
ernments, re‡ecting the assumption that regional governments cannot cooperate
to exploit economies of scale in such activities as research and development.
We model economies of scale in the simplest possible way by supposing that the
cost per project of …nancing to central government of providing some quantity of
the good in every region is c¡k; k > 0: A more sophisticated approach would allow
the economies of scale to depend on the number of regions in which projects are
provided, but this would not change the main results, while adding considerably
to the complexity of the algebra.
Following the large literature on distributive politics, (see e.g. Persson (1998)),
we assume that it is a constitutional restriction that the cost of public good
provision is …nanced out of a proportional income tax levied nationally at rate t:
So, the national budget constraint is
nt = ·(x)(c¡ k)
where ·(x) = #fi 2 N jxi = 1g. Substituting personal and national budget
constraints into the utility function (2.1), we see that the utility from project
vector x = (x1; ::xn) for a type-bi individual in region i is
ui(x; bi) = bixi ¡ ·(x)n (c¡ k) + 1 (2.3)
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So, in choosing x, the central government faces a problem of distributive, or
“pork barrel” politics: expenditures are speci…c to particular regions, whereas the
tax is national. The simplest form of social choice in this case would be to have
a national referendum over pairs of alternatives in Xn. The problem with this
procedure is that it is well-known that in this setting, there is no policy x¤ which
is a Condorcet winner (Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey(1987)), and so a voting
cycle would emerge.
Several resolutions of this problem have been suggested, by placing some struc-
ture on the agenda-setting and voting rules that a legislature may use. One of the
most in‡uential is the legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn(1981),
whose model we adapt for use here. As our model is one where the identities of
the legislators are not exogenously given, we must also specify a procedure by
which legislators are selected from regions, and here, we make use of the citizen-
candidate model of Besley and Coates (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996).
The order of events is as follows.
1. Election of Delegates. (i) any citizen in a region can stand for election (at
some positive cost, ¾ > 0); (ii) those citizens who stand are voted on; (iii) the win-
ner is selected by the plurality rule13 and is that region’s delegate in the national
legislature; (iv) if no delegate stands for election, the region is unrepresented in
the legislative process.
2. The Legislative Process. Suppose that k · n delegates are elected. In
the …rst session, each delegate is selected with probability 1k to make a proposal :
A proposal is a vector ai 2 Xn of projects to be funded. It is then voted on. If
it is accepted by a strict majority of delegates, it is implemented, but if it is not
accepted by a strict majority, then the legislature continues to the next session
in which a member is selected to make another proposal and so on. Sessions take
time, and delegates have a per-session discount factor of ± < 1.
A political equilibrium is (i) a subgame perfect equilibrium to the legislative
game, conditional on the set of delegates; (i) a voting equilibrium in each region,
conditional on the set of candidates in that region, and the delegates elected by
other regions; (iii) a candidate set for each region, where in every region, every
candidate who stands for election does so only if the bene…t of doing so is at least
¾: A more formal description of each of these three stages, plus a proof of the
proposition below14, is given in Appendix A.
13 If k candidates get equal numbers of votes, then each candidate is selected with equal
probability 1=k:
14All subsequent propositions are proved in Appendix B if a proof is required.
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Proposition 1. There is a political equilibrium where (i) exactly one resident
of region i with bi ¸ n¾=m stands for election; (iii) this resident is unanimously
elected as the delegate from region i; (ii) when selected as proposer, the delegate
from region i proposes an ai consisting of a project for region i and m¡ 1 regions
in N=fig;selected at random; (iii) the …rst proposal is accepted by the legislature.
Then from (2.3) and Proposition 1, expected payo¤ to any citizen of region i
in this equilibrium is
uc(bi) =
m
n
h
bi ¡ mn (c¡ k)
i
+ (1 ¡ m
n
)
h
¡m
n
(c¡ k)
i
+ 1 (2.4)
=
m
n
[bi ¡ c + k] + 1
The …rst term on the right-hand side is the expected payo¤ in the event that region
i0s legislator is either selected as proposer, or is randomly selected to be ”bribed”
to vote for the proposal. The second term in the expected payo¤ otherwise.
One way to interpret (2.4) is that under centralization15, any region gets a
project with probability mn , regardless of the region’s willingness to pay for the
project, as measured by bmi: We call this ex ante uniformity; prospects are only
identical for every region before (every round of) legislative bargaining begins. So,
while it is traditional to assume policy uniformity under centralization, we have
generated policy uniformity endogenously, as the outcome of a political equilib-
rium16. It is probably fair to say that Oates(1972) had in mind ex post uniformity
with centralization. However, from the point of view of constitutional design, as
long as the choice of centralization or decentralization is prior to the legisla-
tive bargaining process (and this is a reasonable assumption), it does not matter
whether the uniformity is ex ante or ex post.
15 In other words, with centralization, provision of projects is entirely insensitive to regions’
willingness to pay.
16The political equilibrium described above is not unique, nor are the equilibrium payo¤s
described in (2.4) unique, as there exist multiple equilibria to the legislative subgame. For
example, with three regions, there is an asymmetric equilibrium where the delegate from 1
always makes a proposal to the delegate from 2, and vice versa, and where region 3 never
gets a project, even if it elects a delegate, and consequently does not even both to elect a
delegate. However, the equilibrium generating payo¤s (2.4) seems an excellent candidate for a
“focal” equilibrium, any region is chosen with equal probability to join the “minimum winning
coalition” with the agenda-setter.
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2.4. Pivotal Citizens
In region i, there may be a pivotal citizen with taste parameter b^i who is indi¤erent
between C and D i.e. uc(b^i) = ud(b^i):Writing this out in full using (2.2) and (2.4)
and solving for b^i, we get17
b^i =
½
c + n+1n¡1k if xi = 1
c ¡ k if xi = 0 (2.5)
The importance of the pivotal citizen is that she determines how all citizens in
region i vote on a choice of C versusD; as described in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. If xdi = 1, then all residents of region i with bi > b^i strictly
prefer D, and all residents of region i with bi < b^i strictly prefer C. If xdi = 0,
the reverse is true.
This is intuitive. As all residents in a region bear the same share of cost of pro-
vision, those who value the project more than (resp. less than) the pivotal citizen
will prefer whichever arrangement gives the higher probability (lower probability)
of the project taking place.
3. Constitutional Rules for the Assignment of Powers
As argued in the introduction, we view the choice of centralization or decentral-
ization as generated by constitutional rules (CRs). Here, we specify two CRs that
we wish to study.
The Unitary CR. centralization or decentralization is selected by national ref-
erendum.
The Federal CR. centralization or decentralization is selected by two-stage ref-
erendum. All citizens within a region vote on centralization or decentralization,
and the alternative that has the support of the majority of regions is selected.
The unitary CR captures the idea that a vote in the national parliament, or
national referenda, are used in unitary states to (re)assign powers. The federal
CR is intended to capture the idea that (re) assignment of powers in a federal
17Of course, b^i may not lie in Bi i.e. there may be no citizen that is indi¤erent between C and
D: So we extend the de…nition to these “corner” cases as follows. For example, when xdi = 1;
then if c + mkn¡m · b¡i , then we set b^i = b¡i ; and if c + mkn¡m ¸ b+i , then we set b^i = b+i :
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state usually requires the approval of at least a simple majority of the regions,
and it is this that is being modelled18 .
We turn now to specify the conditions under which each CR selects centraliza-
tion or decentralization. First, the federal CR. Note19 from (2.5) and Proposition 2
that the median voter in region i strictly prefers centralization to decentralization
i¤
bmi 2 (c ¡ k; c+ n + 1n¡ 1k) = BC (3.1)
Note that as the number of regions becomes large, the interval BC becomes sym-
metric around c, with length approximately 2k: To simplify the statement and
proof of subsequent results, we assume in what follows that no median voter is
indi¤erent between centralization and decentralization i.e. bmi 6= c¡ k; c+ n+1n¡1k:
Now with the federal CR, the region votes for the median voter’s most preferred
alternative. So, the above analysis implies that under the federal CR, the fraction
of votes in favor of centralization is
¼F =
#fi 2 N jbmi 2 BC)g
n
(3.2)
Then the federal CR selects centralization i¤ ¼F > 0:5, and decentralization
otherwise.
If the unitary CR is used, from Proposition 2, the fraction of votes in favor of
centralization is
¼U =
1
n
X
fijbmi¸cg
Fi(c +
n + 1
n¡ 1k) +
1
n
X
fijbmi<c g
[1¡ Fi(c¡ k)] (3.3)
and the unitary CR selects centralization i¤ ¼U > 0:5, and decentralization oth-
erwise.
18An important caveat here is that in practice, rules for constitutional amendment are more
complex than this (Wheare(1963)). For example, the approval of a super-majority of regions may
be required, as in the US, where 3/4 of states must approve. Or, as in the case of Switzerland
and Australia, a majority of voters, as well as regions, must apporove. These amendment rules
are di¢cult to analyse, as they give a privileged position to the status quo: that is C (resp. D)
is more likely to be selected by the rule if C (resp. D) is the initial position. Study of such rules
is a topic for future work.
19The proof of this is simple. If c · bmi < c + n+1n¡1k = b^i, then clearly xdi = 1, and so from
Proposition 2, the median voter strictly prefers C: Again, if b^i = c ¡ k < bmi < c, then clearly
xdi = 0, and so from Proposition 2, the median voter again strictly prefers C:
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How do the two CRs compare? Generally, there will be a minority of voters
in a region who disagree with the decision of the median voter of the region.
We call the voters who disagree dissenting voters. It is clear that the way
in which dissenting votes are distributed across regions determines whether or
not the unitary CR con‡icts with the federal CR. For example, if a majority
of regional median voters prefer decentralization, but in those regions, there are
large numbers of dissenting voters who prefer centralization, then the unitary CR
may choose centralization: Of course, this argument works in reverse, so there is
no presumption that the federal rule will choose decentralization more often, or
indeed less often, than the unitary rule.
To understand how dissenting voters may determine the di¤erence between
the two rules, it is very helpful to start with benchmark conditions under which
the rules are equivalent. Say that federal and unitary CRs are equivalent if the
federal CR selects decentralization i¤ the unitary CR selects decentralization: Two
simple su¢cient conditions for equivalence are the following.
Proposition 3. If there is either (i) no intra-regional variation in tastes (Bi ´
fbmig, 8i 2 N),or (i) no inter-regional variation in tastes (bi ´ bj, 8 i; j 2 N ), or
both, federal and unitary CRs are equivalent.
The intuition for this result is clear. First, condition (i) implies that there is
no dissenting vote in any region. Condition (ii) implies that if (de)centralization
is chosen by the federal CR, all regions must vote for this option. So, as at least
50% of the electorate in each region prefers the option, so must at least 50% of the
electorate overall. So, any di¤erence between the two CRs will appear when both
intra-regional and inter-regional variances in tastes are present, as the following
example shows.
Example 1
There are three regions, where regional medians are bm1 = bm2 ¡ ", bm2 = c +
k
2, bm3 = bm2 + ": Also, F1 is uniform with support of length 2Á; and F2; F3 are
uniform with support of length 2µ. So, µ; Á measure intra-regional variation in
tastes, and " measures inter-regional variation in tastes. k
We then have the following fact, proved in the Appendix:
Fact 1. Assume Á = 0 in Example 1. Then, when " < 32k, centralization is chosen
by the federal CR, while decentralization is chosen otherwise. When µ ¸ 2"¡ 3k,
C is chosen by the unitary CR, while decentralization is chosen otherwise. k
So, when Á = 0, there exist parameter values where decentralization is chosen
by the federal CR, and centralization by the unitary CR (but not vice versa), as
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shown in panel (a) of Figure 1. The intuition is as follows. When there is no
intra-regional variance (µ = 0), federal and unitary CRs agree, as predicted by
Proposition 3 above. Now suppose that " > 3k=2, so decentralization is chosen
by both. As µ rises from zero, a dissenting votes in favor of centralization develop
in both high-taste region 3, and low-taste region 1 (namely those residents with
high b0s in the low-taste regions, and low b0s in the high-taste regions.) With a
federal CR, these dissenters are ignored (the tyranny of the majority), but with
a unitary CR, these voters’ preferences count. When there are enough of these
dissenting voters (when µ is high enough), the unitary CR chooses centralization
when the federal CR chooses decentralization. (The disagreement is in the region
RD;UC).
Figure 1 in here
However, we can also establish the opposite, using a di¤erent variant of Ex-
ample 1.
Fact 2. Assume Á > 3k in Example 1. Then, as before, when " < 32k, centraliza-
tion is chosen by the federal CR, while decentralization is chosen otherwise. When
µ < 3k¡2"1¡3k=Á, centralization is chosen by the unitary CR, while decentralization is
otherwise.k
So, in this variant of the example, there exist parameter values where cen-
tralization is chosen by the federal CR, and decentralization by the unitary CR.
This is shown in panel (b) of Figure 1 above, where the federal and unitary deci-
sions are compared. When there is no intra-regional variance (µ = 0), federal and
unitary CRs agree, as predicted by Proposition 3 above. As µ rises, dissenting
votes accumulate in regions 2 and 4, and so the unitary CR eventually chooses
decentralization when the federal CR chooses centralization. (The disagreement
is in the region RC;UD).
4. Asymptotic Results
Proposition 3, plus Example 1, indicates that without imposing some more struc-
ture on the problem, we are unlikely to be able to make general statements compar-
ing unitary and federal rules. In this Section, we study the asymptotic behavior of
the two rules as that when the number of regions is “large”, under some symmetry
assumptions on the distribution of preferences both with and across regions.
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In this case, it turns out, somewhat surprisingly, that a comparison of the two
rules can be based only on the distribution of regional median project bene…ts
i.e. fbmigi2N . In particular, if this distribution is uniform (in the limit, as de…ned
below), then the two rules are equivalent, no matter how the project bene…ts are
distributed within regions. Starting from this benchmark, we can then develop
simple conditions on the limiting distribution of regional median bene…ts for the
federal rule to be either “more” or “less” centralized than the unitary rule. One
of these results is a signi…cant generalization of Cremer and Palfrey’s “Principle
of Aggregation” in the context of our model.
To conduct an asymptotic analysis as the number of regions becomes large, we
assume the following structure: (i) regional median project bene…ts are random
draws from a known distribution; (ii) conditional on the regional median, the
distribution of tastes within any region is the same. Speci…cally, we assume:
A0. Every bmi is a random draw from a common distribution G; where G is
absolutely continuous with support [bm; bm]:
A1. The distribution of project bene…t b in any region with median bm; net of the
median; i.e. y = b¡ bm; is given by F (y) on [y; y]; with F (0) = 0:5 by de…nition.
Now let ¼nF be the proportion of n regions that prefer centralization, given A0 and
A1. From A0, for …xed n, ¼nF is a random variable. Moreover, from 3.1) above,
region i chooses centralization i¤ bmi 2 (c¡k; c+ n+1n¡1k) = Bn: So, as n! 1; the
probability limit of the proportion of regions choosing centralization is
plimn!1¼nF = plimn!1
# fi 2 N jbmi 2 Bng
n
= G(c+k)¡G(c¡k) = ¼F(k) (4.1)
where ¼F(k) is strictly increasing in k: This is intuitive, the higher the cost saving
from centralization, then ceteris paribus, the larger the fraction of regional median
voters who will be in favor of centralization. For future reference, let the unique
solution to ¼F(k) = 0:5 be kF . Then, the federal CR selects centralization i¤ the
cost saving from centralization is su¢ciently high i.e. k > kF :
Now consider the unitary rule. In all regions with a median project bene…t
bm ¸ c, from Proposition 2, the proportion of residents who prefer centralization
is F (c+k ¡bm); and in all regions with a median bm < c, from Proposition 2, the
proportion of residents who prefer centralization is 1 ¡ F (c ¡ k ¡ bm): Now let
¼nU be the proportion of citizens in n regions that prefer centralization, given A0
and A1. Again, from A0, for …xed n, ¼nU is a random variable. Its probability
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limit is
plimn!1¼nU =
Z bm
c
F (c+k¡bm)g(bm)dbm+
Z c
bm
[1¡F (c¡k¡bm)]g(bm)dbm = ¼U(k)
(4.2)
Again, note that ¼U(k) is increasing in k: For future reference, let the unique
solution to ¼U(k) = 0:5 be kU . Then, the federal CR selects centralization i¤
k > kU:
We say that the federal CR is more centralized (decentralized) than the unitary
CR if, when centralization is chosen by the unitary rule, it is also chosen by
the federal rule (vice-versa). Using the above arguments, these two cases can be
expressed as
kU > kF ; kU < kF (4.3)
For example, if the federal CR is more centralized, the cost advantage to central-
ization has to be higher (ceteris paribus) for centralization to be chosen under the
unitary CR. Finally, the federal and unitary CRs are equivalent when kU = kF :
The main results of this section show that when certain symmetry assumptions
are made about the distributions F;G, then whether the federal CR is more or
less decentralized than the unitary CR depends only on the shape of G: These
assumptions are the following:
A2. F; G are symmetric:
A3. In the limit, half the regions choose projects with decentralization i.e.
plimn!1#fi2Njbmi¸c gn = 0:5:
These assumptions impose two forms of symmetry. A2 requires that the
within-region project bene…ts and median bene…ts across regions are both sym-
metrically distributed. A3 ensures that the choices of regions under decentraliza-
tion are symmetric.
Assumptions A2,A3 imply the following very useful simpli…cations. First, A3
plus A2 imply that bmhas a mean value of c: Therefore, it follows that G(bm) ´
¡(bm ¡ c); where ¡ is a symmetric mean-zero distribution. So, from (4.1),
¼F(k) = ¡(k) ¡ ¡(¡k) = 2¡(k) ¡ 1 (4.4)
where the second equality follows from the symmetry of ¡: Second, de…ning x =
bm¡ c, x = bm ¡ c; °(x) = ¡0(x); we get:
¼U (k) =
Z bm
c
F (c+ k ¡ bm)g(bm)dbm +
Z c
bm
[1¡ F (c ¡ k ¡ bm)]g(bm)dbm (4.5)
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=
Z bm
c
F (c+ k ¡ bm)°(bm¡ c)dbm +
Z c
bm
[1¡ F (c ¡ k ¡ bm)]°(bm¡ c)dbm
=
Z x
0
F (k ¡ x)°(x)dx +
Z 0
¡x
[1 ¡ F (¡k ¡ x)]°(x)dx
=
Z x
0
F (k ¡ x)°(x)dx +
Z 0
¡x
F (k + x)°(x)dx
=
Z x
0
F (k ¡ x)°(x)dx +
Z x
0
F (k ¡ z)°(¡z)dz
= 2
Z x
0
F (k ¡ x)°(x)dx
Here, we have used the de…nition of ¡ in the second line, a change of variables
in the third, the symmetry of F (around zero, by de…nition) in the fourth, a
change of variables in the second integral in the …fth, and …nally the symmetry
of ° around zero in the sixth.
We are now in a position to state and prove our …rst, benchmark, result.
Theorem 1. If A0-A3 hold, and in addition, the regional medians are uniformly
distributed across regions i.e. ¡ is uniform, then the federal and unitary CRs are
equivalent i.e. kF = kU :
So, we see that in the borderline case is where the distribution of regional
median project bene…ts is uniform, irrespective of how project bene…ts are dis-
tributed within regions. What happens when we move away from the uniform?
LetH be any absolutely continuous distribution function with support [a; b]: Then
we have the following de…nition:
De…nition.H is strictly positively (negatively) single-peaked if the density h(:) is
strictly quasi-concave (quasi-convex) on [a; b] :
Note that if a density function is positively (negatively) single-peaked and is
symmetric around zero, then it must have a global maximum (minimum) at zero.
We now have,
Theorem 2. Assume that A0-A3 hold, that jb¡ bmj · ¡¡1(0:75) and in addition,
¡ is strictly positively single-peaked. Then, the federal CR is more centralized
than the unitary CR i.e. kF < kU:
The intuition is that the proportion of median voters in each region prefer-
ring centralization under the federal CR, ¼F ; is more responsive to changes in ¡
away from the uniform distribution than the proportion of all voters preferring
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centralism under the unitary CR, ¼U: In turn, this is because ¼F does not take
account of the views of dissenting voters. The following example may help clarify
this argument. Suppose that ¡ is initially uniform on [¡1; 1] and it is changed
to a positively single-peaked distribution ¡+ by moving some probability weight
± from the tails to the centre i.e. so that ¡+ has a mass-point of ± at zero,
and the remaining fraction 1 ¡ ± of regional means are distributed uniformly on
[¡(1¡ ±=2); 1¡ ±=2] : Then, as long as the median voters in the regions in the
tails of the distribution initially preferred decentralization (1 ¡ ±=2 > c + k); a
fraction ± more median voters will prefer centralization with ¡+. So, ¼F rises by
±:
Now consider a region i whose median voter was initially in the positive tail
of the distribution i.e. where bmi ' 1; assuming ± small: Initially, a fraction
F (c+ k¡ bmi) ' F (c+ k¡ 1) < 0:5 of the voters in i already prefer centralization
(the dissenting voters). After the switch, F (k) > 0:5 of the voters now prefer
centralization. So, in this region, the net increase in the number of voters pre-
ferring centralization is F (k) ¡ F (c+ k ¡ 1) < 1: So, ¼U rises by approximately
± [F (k) ¡ F (c + k ¡ 1)] < ± following the switch.
The same intuition explains our next result:
Theorem 3. Assume that A0-A3 hold, that jb¡ bmj · bm ¡ c ¡ ¡¡1(0:75) and
in addition, ¡ is strictly negatively single-peaked. Then, the federal CR is more
decentralized than the unitary CR i.e. kF > kU:
Note that the upper bound on the support of b¡bm is strictly positive20 . This
strong characterization of the relationship between federal and unitary CRs has
used the symmetry assumptions A2 and A3. We now present two examples which
show that these assumptions cannot be relaxed.
Example 2. First, x = bm¡ c is distributed according to ¡; with density
°(x) =
½ 1
2° 0 · x · °
1
2¼ ¡¼ · x < 0
Also, F is given by the density21
f =
1
2Á
; ¡Á · y · Á
Note that if ° 6= ¼; ¡ is asymmetric, violating assumption A2, but that A3 is
always satis…ed. So, from (4.2), the proportion of regions preferring centralization
20bm ¡ c ¡ ¡¡1(0:75) = x ¡ ¡¡1(0:75) > 0 , ¡(x) > 0:75; but by de…nition, ¡(x) = 1:
21To ensure that b ¸ 0, we need c ¸ ¼ + Á:
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is
¼F(k) = ¡(k)¡ ¡(¡k) = k2° +
k
2¼
= k
2
µ
¼°
(¼+ °)
¶
So, as ¼F (kF) = 0:5;
kF =
¼°
(¼ + °)
Now, from (4.3), and changing the variable of integration, see that the proportion
of voters preferring centralization is:
¼U (k) =
Z °
0
k ¡ x+ Á
2Á
1
2°
dx+
Z 0
¡¼
·
1¡
µ¡k ¡ x + Á
2Á
¶¸
1
2°
dx
= 0:5 +
1
8Á
[(2k ¡ ° + 2Á) + (2k ¡ ¼ ¡ 2Á)]
So, as ¼U (kU ) = 0:5;
kU =
° + ¼
4
So, the two CRs are only equivalent if °+¼4 =
¼°
(¼+°) ; which holds i¤ ¼ = °. So, as
long as the distribution of ¡ asymmetric i.e. ¼ 6= °, Theorem 1 no longer holds.
k
Now we present an example which shows that the benchmark result does not
hold either when A3 does not hold.
Example 3. First, x = bm¡ c is distributed uniformly on [¡° + ¯; ° + ¯] with
j¯j < ° i.e. ¡(x) = x+°¡¯2° . So, as long as ¯ 6= 0; the mean of bm is no longer c
and consequently, A3 is violated. It is easily checked that kF = 0:5°. Now, also
assume that F is distributed uniformly on [¡0:5; 0:5] i.e. F (y) = y + 0:5: Then
¼U (k) =
1
2°
·Z ¯+°
0
F (k ¡ x)dx +
Z 0
¯¡°
(1¡ F (¡k ¡ x))dx
¸
= 1
2°
·Z ¯+°
0
(0:5 + k ¡ x)dx +
Z 0
¯¡°
(0:5 + k + x)dx
¸
=
1
2°
£
2°(0:5 + k) ¡ 0:5(¯ + °)2 ¡ 0:5(¯ ¡ °)2¤
= 0:5 + k ¡ 0:5¯2=° ¡ 0:5°
Now, as ¼U (kU) = 0:5, we see that
kU = 0:5¯2=° +0:5°
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So, as long as A3 is not satis…ed, i.e. ¯ 6= 0, then kU > kF i.e. the unitary
CR is more decentralized than the federal CR, and consequently Theorem 1 fails.
Interestingly, the unitary CR is more decentralized whether Ebm is greater or less
than c. k
Finally, we can state some comparative-statics results that describes how
kF ; kU vary as the dispersion of preferences for project bene…ts increases, both
across and within regions. We model an increase in the dispersion of median
project bene…ts across (within) regions as a mean-preserving spread in the distri-
bution of G (F ): It is fairly obvious from (4.4) that (i) following a mean-preserving
spread in the distribution ofG, median voters in more regions will prefer decentral-
ization, and so the cost saving from centralization at which half the median voters
prefer centralization, namely kF ; will rise, and (ii) following a mean-preserving
spread in the distribution of F , kF is unchanged. The following theorem also
establishes some less obvious results about what happens to kU :
Theorem 4. If A0-A3 hold, then following a symmetric mean-preserving spread
in G;both kF ; kU rise. If A0-A3 hold, then following a symmetric mean-preserving
spread in F ; (i) kF is left unchanged; (ii) if, in addition, the hypotheses of Theorem
2 (Theorem 3) hold, kU rises (falls).
These results establish that an increase in the dispersion of median project
bene…ts across and within regions a¤ects our two constitutional rules in quite
di¤erent ways. An increase in the dispersion of median project bene…ts across
regions makes both rules unambiguously more “likely" to choose decentralization,
whereas an increase in the dispersion of project bene…ts within regions has an
ambiguous e¤ect on the unitary rule - it may make centralisation more likely.
5. E¢ciency of Constitutions
We are now in a position to assess the relative e¢ciency of federal and unitary
constitutions. As utility is linear in income, the model is one of transferable
utility, and so the natural measure of e¢ciency is the aggregate surplus, or sum of
utilities. If the aggregate surplus is greater under the federal CR, then the federal
19
CR is unambiguously potentially Pareto-preferred22 . The aggregate surplus is
W k = E
nX
i=1
uk(bi)
in the case of centralization (k = c) and decentralization (k = d), and where the
expectation is taken with respect to variables (b1; :bn): An alternative way if justi-
fying the use of aggregate surplus as a measure of e¢ciency is to suppose following
Buchanan that choice between constitutions should be thought of as taking place
behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” (Dixit (1996)): If we suppose that the veil
is complete i.e. every citizen, ex ante, believes that is equally likely that he will
be resident in any region and if resident in region i, will have characteristics bi
drawn at random from the distribution Fi. In this case, the expected utility of
the citizen behind the veil of ignorance can be calculated as W k=n.
Now, using (2:4), (2.3), we see that the gain from a move to decentralization
for a resident of region i with taste parameter bi is:
uD(bi)¡ uC(bi) = ¢i = Á(bi; bmi)¡ mn (bi ¡ c)¡
m
n
k
with
Á(bi; bmi) =
½
bi ¡ c if bmi ¸ c
0 otherwise
For simplicity, we assume from now on that the distribution of bi is symmetric
(Ebi = bmi). Then, taking expectations over the bi, it is easy to show that
E¢i =
h
maxfbmi ¡ c; 0g ¡ mn (bmi ¡ c)
i
¡ m
n
k
That is, the expected gain from decentralization across all residents of region
i is just the gain to decentralization for the median voter in that region. The …rst
term of E¢i in the square brackets captures the gain of being able to respond
more ‡exibly to regional preferences. The term ¡mk=n is the loss implied by the
inability to exploit economies of scale. So the gain to decentralization for a …xed
number n of regions ins
¢n =
nX
i=1
E¢i
22Of course, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is only of interest here if lump-sum transfers between
regions are possible at the point where the choice between centralization and decentralization
is made.
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So, the e¢cient CR selects decentralization i¤ ¢n ¸ 0: Note that with bi sym-
metrically distributed, the e¢cient CR is independent of the distribution of the
taste parameter bi within each region, as is the federal CR.
We now turn to discuss e¢ciency of federal and unitary CRs against this
benchmark. De…ne a CR to be e¢cient if it makes the same selection of C or D
as the e¢cient CR. Say that the federal rule is more e¢cient than the unitary
rule, if whenever the unitary rule leads to an e¢cient decision, the federal rule
does also, and vice versa. Also, say that a rule is ine¢ciently (de)centralized if
when it makes an ine¢cient choice, it chooses (de) centralization.
Both rules may be ine¢cient, for the usual reason that majority voting does
not take into account intensity of preference. However, in general, neither CR is
biased in any particular direction; i.e. neither rule is ine¢ciently centralized or
decentralized. The following example illustrates this.
Example 4
Suppose that there are three regions, with bm1 = bm2 = c = 1; k = 0:5; and
bm3 = 9. Then, it is easy to calculate that E¢1 = E¢2 = ¡1, but E¢3 = 3.
Then, as
P3
i=1E¢i = 1, the e¢cient CR will choose D, but as a majority of
regions have E¢i < 0, the federal CR will choose C.
On the other hand, suppose that bm3 = 0, bm1 = bm2 = 3, with the other
parameters as before. Then, E¢1 = E¢2 = 1=3, but E¢3 = ¡1. Then, asP3
i=1E¢i = ¡1=3, the e¢cient CR will choose C, but as a majority of regions
have E¢i > 0, the federal CR will choose D.k
However, in the asymptotic case as n becomes large, as shown above, there are
a number of conditions (A0-A3), under which we can say compare the federal and
unitary rules quite straightforwardly. It turns out that under the same assump-
tions, we can obtain a quite tight characterization of how both rules compare to
the e¢cient benchmark.
First, we can calculate the probability limit of the gain from decentralization
under conditions A0-A3 when the principle of aggregation holds;
plimn!1¢n =
Z bm
c
(bm¡ c)g(bm)dbm¡ 0:5(Ebm¡ c)¡ 0:5k (5.1)
=
Z bm
c
(bm¡ c)g(bm)dbm¡ 0:5k
=
Z x
0
xg(x)dx¡ 0:5k
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We have used the fact that Ebm = c from A3 in the second line, and a change of
variable in the last line. Clearly, from (5.1) centralization is strictly more e¢cient
i¤
R x
0 xg(x)dx¡ 0:5k > 0; or
k > 2
Z x
0
xg(x)dx = kE
We now have the following result.
Theorem 5. Assume A0-A3. If G is uniform, then both rules are e¢cient
(kF = kU = kE): If G is strictly positively single-peaked, then the federal rule is
ine¢ciently centralized (kF < kE): If G is strictly negatively single-peaked, then
the federal rule is ine¢ciently decentralized (kF > kE):
The intuition for this result is the following. When ¡ deviates from the uniform
by (say) becoming strictly positively single-peaked, a proportion x% of median
voters will change their preference from decentralisation to centralisation. But
some of these “switchers” will only gain a very small amount, as they were nearly
indi¤erent, so that the increase in expected bene…t from centralisation relative to
decentralisation (i.e. the percentage change in ¢n) will be less than x%:
It remains to say something about the unitary rules in the non-uniform case.
Let F be the set of symmetric single-peaked zero-mean distributions on [¡y; y],
and let A ½ F have the property that for any two distributions F; F 0 in A, one
distribution is a mean-preserving spread of another. Then, due to the symmetry
of members of A, if F 0 is a mean-preserving spread of F , the variance of F 0 is
greater than that of F . Suppose we denote the variance of F by ¾2F ; this number23
uniquely de…nes any F in A. and so the line is negatively sloped. Then we can
state the following:
Theorem 6. Assume F 2 A. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, there exists
an ¾^2 such that (i) for any ¾2F < ¾^
2, the unitary rule is more e¢cient than the
federal rule, but is ine¢ciently centralized; (ii) when ¾2F = ¾^
2, the unitary rule is
e¢cient: (iii) when ¾2F > ¾^
2, the unitary rule is ine¢ciently decentralized.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, there exists an ¾^2 such that (i) for any
¾2F < ¾^
2, the unitary rule is more e¢cient than the federal rule, but is ine¢ciently
decentralized; (ii) when ¾2F = ¾^
2, the unitary rule is e¢cient: (iii) when ¾2F > ¾^
2,
the unitary rule is ine¢ciently centralized.
So, not surprisingly, when ¾2F is small, the unitary CR behaves in a similar
23Note that ¾2F · y2; as y2 is the maximum possible variance of all distributions in A.
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may to the federal CR, but less obviously, when ¾2F is large enough, the unitary
CR may exhibit a di¤erent direction of ine¢ciency than the federal CR.
6. Related Literature and Conclusions
This paper has attempted both a positive and normative analysis of two “con-
stitutional rules” for choosing the degree of decentralization, in the setting of a
particular model of the costs and bene…ts of decentralization. In the asymptotic
case, we have obtained a number of results about how these rules di¤er; the key
determinant of the di¤erence seems to be how median voter preferences are dis-
tributed across regions. The e¢ciency of both CRs has also been investigated.
One of the main limitations of the current study is that the CRs studied are very
oversimpli…ed. In particular, one key feature of real-world CRs is that they are
“rigid” in the sense that they favor the status quo e.g. rules for constitutional
amendment in federal states. One topic for future research is to investigate the
positive and normative properties of these rigid CRs.
The results of this paper can be compared to Cremer and Palfrey(1996). In
the basic model of their paper, where taste parameters were Normally distributed,
they showed24 that - in our terminology - whenever a unitary CR chooses central-
ization, the federal CR does also. Cremer and Palfrey call this result “the principle
of aggregation”. They also argued that it was robust to several extensions, includ-
ing other possible statistical distributions for tastes, such as the uniform, but do
not provide any general conditions under which it holds25. Bearing in mind that
the two papers build quite di¤erent models of the costs and bene…ts of decentral-
ization, we can note the following. If ¡ has a Normal distribution with mean zero,
(truncated so that bm is positive), it is symmetric and positively single-peaked, so
Theorem 2 applies, and Theorem 2 states the “principle of aggregation” for this
24Cremer and Palfrey obtained formulae for the proportion of regions, and the proportion
of voters, who prefer centralization, as a function of only one parameter ¾2; the ratio of the
inter -regional variance in tastes to the intra-regional variance in tastes. They established two
main facts in their paper, both in the limiting case as the number of regions went to in…nity.
First, when this ratio was below some ¾^2, the proportion of regions preferring centralization was
greater than the proportion of individual voters preferring centralization: Second; for all values
of the ratio below ¾^2, the proportion of individual voters preferring centralization was greater
than 0.5 (and so the unitary CR chose centralization).
25 In Section 4.3 of their paper, they present a uniform distribution example where 100% of
regions prefer centralization, in which case the principle of aggregation certainly holds, but this
example is not general.
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model.
There are several other recent papers that are more loosely related to this one.
Besley and Coate(1998) and Lockwood(1998) build ”political economy” models
of the choice between centralization and decentralization, but with a di¤erent
focus, namely to study the political ine¢ciency of centralization. Our model has
elements of both models, but is deliberately stylized, so as to enable an analysis of
federal and unitary CRs. Bolton and Roland (1995) study a model quite similar
to the one of this paper26, but the purpose of their analysis is rather di¤erent,
namely, to analyze possible secession by one of the regions, and how the threat of
secession changes the tax policy of central government.
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A. Political Equilibrium with Centralization
Legislative Equilibrium
Some details of the legislative game are as follows. Let K be the set of regions
that elect delegates. Assume for the moment that K = N: A time index t =
0; 1; 2; :: tracks the number of “rounds” of legislative bargaining. The strategies of
the delegates are as follows. If at time t delegate i is proposer, he must choose a
proposal ai = (xi1; ::xin) 2 Xn conditional on the history of play up to that point,
Ht. If at time t delegate i is a responder, he must choose a response ri 2 fyes,nog
conditional on the history of play up to that point (Ht; aj) where j is proposer.
If a strict majority of delegates choose ri =yes, the proposal is approved and the
game terminates. Otherwise, the game continues to the next round.
Following Baron, we restrict attention to stationary equilibria. A stationary
equilibrium has the property that whenever g and h are structurally identical
subgames, the continuation values of any player i (denoted Vi) are the same in
both subgames, no matter what the time period i.e. Vi(¿; g) = Vi(¿ 0; h) when
g = h.
Now let Vi denote the payo¤ in the subgame beginning with the random selec-
tion of candidates. In a stationary equilibrium, delegate i will vote for proposal j
i¤
xji b
d
i ¡ k(ai)n (c¡ k) ¸ ±Vi (A.1)
where ± < 1 is the discount factor, and bdi is the taste parameter of the delegate.
Say that j o¤ers i a project if xji = 1. Conjecture then that if delegate i is
proposer, he chooses m ¡ 1 delegates at random and o¤ers them projects, (as
well as choosing a project for himself) and these delegates accept. Given these
strategies, delegate i0s continuation payo¤ at the proposer selection stage is
Vi =
m
n
(bdi ¡ c+ k) (A.2)
It is then clear from (A.2) that if i is o¤ered a project, (A.1) reduces to
bdi ¡ mn (c ¡ k) ¸ ±
m
n
(bdi ¡ c+ k)
which certainly holds. So, all delegates will accept projects if o¤ered. It remains
to show that this is the best strategy for the proposer. This follows from two
observations.
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First, if delegate i is proposer, he will never o¤er projects to more than m¡ 1
delegates, as only m delegates are needed to approve a proposal, and additional
o¤ers raise the cost to the proposer through the tax rule. Second, if delegate i is
not o¤ered a project, he will never accept a proposal as ¡mn (c¡k) < ±mn (bdi ¡c+k)
as long as ± < 1, bdi ¸ 0.
Now consider the case where region i does not elect a delegate i.e. K = N=(ig:
If no delegate from region i is elected, then there is a legislative game with n¡ 1
delegates excluding region i, but the residents of region i continue to pay tax.
There is a stationary equilibrium of the game with n¡ 1 delegates with the same
structure as that described above, where at each round the proposer j selects at
random m¡ 1 regions in N=fi; jg and o¤ers them projects, and the …rst proposal
is accepted. Consequently, the payo¤ to any resident of i in this case is
W = ¡m
n
(c¡ k) (A.3)
Voting Equilibrium
At the voting stage, every resident of i can vote for one of the candidates, or
abstain. First, assume that only one candidate stands. As Vi ¡ W > 0, for all
bi 2 Bi, all voters strictly prefer to be represented rather than not, so a single
candidate is always elected.
Second, assume that l > 1 candidates are standing for election. We have
established that whatever the bdi of the delegate from region i, he will adopt the
same strategy at the legislative stage. So, all delegates yield any citizen the same
payo¤. This means that all voters are indi¤erent between candidates. Assuming
w.l.o.g. that indi¤erent voters randomize over candidates with equal probabilities,
all candidates are elected with equal probability.
Candidate Entry
It is clear from (A.2), (A.3) that as long as
Vi ¡W = mn bi ¸ ¾
it pays a resident of i with taste parameter ¾ to stand for election, given that no
other resident is standing. So, there is always a one-candidate equilibrium where
one candidate stands with probability one, as claimed. ¤
B. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2. We only give the proof for the case where b^i 2 Bi; the
proof in the “corner” case is similar. It is clear that if uc(b^i) = ud (^bi) and xdi = 1
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then uc(b) < ud(b); b > b^i, and uc(b) < ud(b); b < b^i. The argument is the same
for a region where xdi = 0: ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) In this case, all citizens in a given region have iden-
tical preferences, so again there are no dissenting voters: It follows immediately
from (3.2) and (3.3) that the federal and unitary constitutions are equivalent.
(ii) Let centralization = C; decentralization = D: It is clear that with bi ´ bj,
i; j 2 N , regions are unanimous in their choice of some A ½ fC;Dg. As the total
net dissenting vote is bounded below 0.5; if the federal CR chooses A, then so
must the unitary CR. ¤
Proof of Fact 1. (a) First consider the choice of a federal CR between C
and D: In the example, bm2 is constructed to be in the centre of the interval
BC = (c ¡ k; c+ 2k), so that bm1; bm3 are in this interval i¤ " < 32k.
(b) Now the unitary CR. As Á = 0, all voters in region 2 choose C. So, the
proportion of all voters choosing C is
¼ =
1
3
[1 + (1¡ F1(c ¡ k)) + F3(c+ 2k)] (B.1)
where
Fi(x) =
x¡ bmi + µ
2µ
; i = 1; 3, bmi ¡ µ · x · bmi + µ (B.2)
So, it is easy to compute
1 ¡ F1(c¡ k) = F3(c+2k) = 0:5 +
3
2k ¡ "
2µ
(B.3)
Combining (B.1) and (B.3), the proportion of voters preferring C is greater than
one half (¼ > 0:5) i¤
µ > 2"¡ 3k
As µ ¸ 0, the Fact follows. ¤
Proof of Fact 2. In this case, we suppose that Á > 32k; so that some voters in
region 2 prefer D. Then, the proportion of voters preferring C is then
¼ =
1
3
[F2(c+ 2k) ¡ F2(c ¡ k) + (1¡ F1(c ¡ k)) + F3(c+ 2k)]
Also, using the fact that F2 is de…ned as in (B.2) with µ replacing Á, it is easy to
compute that
F2(c +2k)¡ F2(c¡ k) = 3k2Á
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So, after substitution,
¼ =
1
3
·
3k
2Á
+ 1+
3
2k ¡ "
µ
¸
Now assume that Á > 3k: Then ¼ > 0:5 i¤ µ < 3k¡2"1¡3k=Á , as required. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1. First, we calculate an explicit formula for kF : By assump-
tion, ¡(x) = x+x2x . So, from (4.4), ¼F(k) = k=x, so kF = 0:5x. To prove the result,
it is su¢cient to show that ¼U(kF) = 0:5: Now note that as ¡ is uniform, from
(4.5), we have;
¼U (k) =
1
x
Z x
0
F (k ¡ x)dx
So,
¼U(kF ) =
1
x
Z x
0
F (0:5x ¡ x)dx = 1
x
Z 0:5x
¡0:5x
F (y)dy; y = 0:5x¡ x
Now, as F (0) = 0:5; and F is symmetric around zero, it is easy to see thatR 0:5x
¡0:5xF (y)dy = 0:5x. So, ¼U(kF) = 0:5 as required. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) Write ¼U (k; F ) in (4.5) with the dependence of ¼U on
F made explicit. De…ne kU(F ) implicitly by
¼U (kU(F ); F ) ´ 0:5 (B.4)
Let F be the class of symmetric, single-peaked zero mean distributions on [¡y; y].
Then, then it is su¢cient to show that:
kU (F ) > kF , all F 2 F (B.5)
Note also that kU(F0) = kF , where F0 is the degenerate distribution27 with all the
probability mass at y = 0. Also, any non-degenerate F 2 F is a symmetric MPS
of F0: Then, to establish (B.5), all we need to prove is that
kU (F 0) > kU(F ) (B.6)
where F 0 is a symmetric MPS of F: For then from (B.6), kU(F ) > kU (F0) = kF ,
any F 2 F as required.
27That is, F0(y) =
½
0 y < 0
1 y ¸ 0 :
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(ii) To prove (B.6), as ¼U is increasing in k, it su¢ces to show that if F 0 is a
mean-preserving spread of F , then ¼U(F 0; kF ) < ¼U(F; kF): But from (4.5), this
is equivalent to
¢ =
Z x
0
[F (kF ¡ x)]°(x)dx¡
Z x
0
[F 0(kF ¡ x)]°(x)dx > 0
Now note that as y = b¡ bm; jb¡ bmj · ¡¡1(0:75) implies y · ¡¡1(0:75): But
¼F (kF) = 2¡(kF) ¡ 1 = 0:5; implying ¡(kF) = 0:75. But then, y · kF ; so we
have;Z x
0
F (kF ¡ x)°(x)dx = °(kF ¡ y)¡ °(0) +
Z minfx;kF+yg
kF¡y
F (kF ¡ x)°(x)dz
So,
¢ =
Z minfx;kF+yg
kF¡y
[F (kF ¡ x)¡ F 0(kF ¡ x)]°(x)dx
But now from Rothschild and Stiglitz(1971) if F 0 is a MPS of F , we must have
F 0(z) > F (z); z < 0; F 0(z) < F (z); z > 0;
Z y
¡y
F (z)dz =
Z y
¡y
F 0(z)dz (B.7)
If the MPS is symmetric, then both F; F 0 must also be symmetric. These condi-
tions in fact imply that F 0 ¡F is a symmetric function round 0 in the sense that
.
F 0(¡z)¡ F (¡z) = F (z) ¡ F 0(z) = Á(z); z > 0 (B.8)
So, we have;
¢ =
Z kF
kF¡y
[F (kF ¡ x) ¡ F 0(kF ¡ x)] °(x)dx+
Z minfx;kF+yg
kF
[F (kF ¡ x) ¡ F 0(kF ¡ x)] °(x)dx
¸
Z kF
kF¡y
[F (kF ¡ x) ¡ F 0(kF ¡ x)] °(x)dx+
Z kF+y
kF
[F (kF ¡ x)¡ F 0(kF ¡ x)] °(x)dx
=
Z y
0
[F (z)¡ F 0(z)] °(kF ¡ z)dx ¡
Z y
0
[F 0(z) ¡ F (z)] °(kF + z)dx
=
Z y
0
Á(z) [°(kF ¡ z) ¡ °(kF + z)] dx
> 0
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In this sequence of inequalities, we have used: (i) in the second line, the fact that
F (kF ¡ x) < F 0(kF ¡ x) when x > kF , from (B.7); (ii) change of variables in the
third line; (iii) (B.8) in the fourth line; (iv) °(kF ¡ z) > °(kF + z) from single-
peakedness of ¡ and kF > y > z in the …nal line. So, we have proved ¢ > 0, as
required. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4. (i) The results concerning kF are obvious. (ii) Note that
it is established in the proof of Theorem 2 that kU(F 0) > kU(F ) , where F 0 is
any symmetric MPS of F: It follows immediately that when the hypotheses of
Theorem 2 hold, kU rises following a symmetric MPS in F: A similar argument
shows that the hypotheses of Theorem 3 hold, kU falls following a symmetric
MPS in F:
(iii) It remains to prove that following a symmetric mean-preserving spread in
G; kU rises. But recall that
¼U(k; F ) = 2
Z x
0
[F (k ¡x)]°(x)dx
Now, consider a symmetric MPS in ¡: This is a sequence of simple symmetric
MPSs. From Rothschild and Stiglitz(1971), Each simple symmetric MPS in the
sequence (from ¡ to ¡0) can be characterized as follows
°0(x) = °(x) + s(x)
s(x) = ®[I[¡±¡"¡t;¡±¡"] ¡ I[¡±¡t;¡±] + I[±+";±+"+t] ¡ I[±;±+t], " > t; ± + "+ t < x
where I[a;b] is the indicator function on [a; b]. So, s is a function that moves
a probability mass t® to the tails of the distribution of °, while keeping the
distribution symmetric.
But then
¼0U (k; F )¡ ¼U(k; F ) = 2
Z x
0
[F (k ¡ x)](°0(x) ¡ °(x))dx
= 2
Z x
0
[F (k ¡ x)](I[±+";±+"+t] ¡ I[±;±+t])dx
· 2t® [F (k ¡ ± ¡ ") ¡ F (k ¡ ± ¡ t)]
< 0
So, if ¼U (k; F ) = 0:5, ¼0U(k; F ) < 0:5: Consequently, k must rise to achieve
¼0U (k; F ) = 0:5; implying that the curve shifts outward. ¤
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Proof of Theorem 5. Denote by H the distribution of x, conditional on x being
positive (i.e.H(x) = 2¡(x)¡ 1; so h is given by 2g(x); x 2 [0; x]). Then, kE is the
mean of this distribution i.e.
kE = 2
Z x
0
x°(x)dx = E [x jx ¸ 0 ]
Also, note that kF is the median of H; as H (kF) = 2G(kF ) ¡ 1 = 0:5, where the
last inequality follows from the de…nition of kF
Now if G; and therefore ¡ is uniform, then H us uniform also and therefore
symmetric, so kF = kE: If ¡ is positively single-peaked, then H is skewed to the
right and so kE > kF : If ¡ is negatively single-peaked, then H is skewed to the
left and so kE < kF : ¤
Proof of Theorem 6. First note that if F 0; F 2 A, then F 0 has higher variance
than F i¤ it is a MPS of F: Now suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold.
Then from the proof of Theorem 2, it is clear that (a) kF < kU(F ), and (b) kU (F )
is increasing in ¾2F . Then, as kE > kF from Theorem 6; either; (i) there must be
some critical variance e¾2 for which kU(F ) = kE , or (ii) kU (F ) < kE, all F . To
over both these cases, recall that the maximum possible variance of F is ¾^2 = y2;
and set ¾^2 = min
©e¾2; y2ª : In the case where the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold,
the proof is similar. ¤
C. Proof of the Optimality of Decentralization in the Cremer-
Palfrey Model
One can calculate the expected utility of all voters in a district (in their terminol-
ogy) under centralization or decentralization as EUC = ¡E [E [(t¡M ) jt; d]] and
EUD = ¡E[E[(t¡md) jt; d]] . respectively. So, assuming large numbers of equal-
sized districts, we get, applying the law of iterated projection and the relevant
formulae for E [(t¡M) jt; d] ; E[(t¡md) jt; d] in Cremer and Palfrey’s paper that
EUC = ¡Et2 (C.1)
EUD = ¡ 1
1 + ¾2d
¡ Et
2
(1 + ¾2d)2
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Some decentralization is preferred if EUD > EUC , which requires, after some
rearrangement of (C.1), that
2 + ¾2d
1 + ¾2d
< Et2 (C.2)
Now, by de…nition, Et2 = E(t ¡ md)2 + 2Etmd ¡ Em2d: Using the facts that
t » N(md; 1); md » N(0; ¾2d), (so that (t ¡md)2 » Â2(1)); we see that
Et2 = 1 + ¾2d > 1
So, as the left-hand side of (C.2) is less than 1; (C:2) must always hold. ¤
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